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Allocation of Capital in the Post Liberalized Regime: A 
Case Study of the Indian Corporate Sector 
 
 
The paper investigates the prevalent trends in the allocation of capital in an emerging 
economy, India, during the post financial liberalization regime. In contrast to the 
conventional wisdom that financial liberalization leads to better allocation of funds, the 
study could not find any obvious evidence of increase in the efficiency over the reform 
period, especially during the early years of reform. Further, the study highlights the 
disturbing trend of convergence of efficiencies across various strata of firms towards a 
lower level over the reform period. The paper rationalizes the decline as a result of 
excessive capacity creation in certain industries, financed by cheap external sources of 
finance, without any consideration of return or demand conditions. The paper, as a policy 
recommendation, highlights the importance of creating appropriate institutions prior to 
pursuing financial liberalization in developing countries like India.    
 
JEL Classification: G1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
A fundamental job of the financial sector of any economy is to allocate capital efficiently. To 
achieve this, capital is supposed to be invested in the sectors that are expected to have high 
returns and be withdrawn from sectors with poor prospects. It has been argued that formal 
financial markets and associated institutions improve the capital allocation process and thus 
contribute to the economic growth. However, there is little actual evidence on whether and 
how financial markets improve the allocation of capital. There is a small body of work that 
provides only indirect evidence of the effect of financial liberalization on the efficiency of 
resource allocation. Using a panel of Ecuadorian firms during the 80's, Jaramillo, 
Schiantarelli and Weiss (1992) find that there was an increase in the flow of credit accruing 
to more efficient firms after liberalization, controlling for other firms' characteristics. Siregar 
(1992) obtained similar results for Indonesian establishments in the 80's. Using firm level 
data Chari and Henry (2002) show that a typical firm experiences an increase in both Tobin's 
q and investment after account liberalization. However, they have concluded that 
reallocation of investment is not significantly correlated to changes in systematic risk or 
investment opportunities.  More recently, Wurgler (2000), using a data set comprising of 65 
countries and 28 industries over 33 years finds that the developed financial markets, as 
measured by the size of the domestic stock and credit markets relative to GDP, are 
associated with a better allocation of capital which is achieved by increasing investment in 
the growing industries and decreasing investment in the declining industries. Thus, although 
financially developed countries might not invest at a higher level (Carlin and Mayer, 1998; 
Beck, Levine, and Loayza, 2000), they do seem to allocate their investment better. For 
example, the elasticity of industry investment to value added is several times higher in 
Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. than in financially underdeveloped 
countries such as Bangladesh, India, Panama, and Turkey. Compared to the countries with 
large financial markets, other countries both over-invest in their declining industries and 
under-invest in their growing industries.  
Though there are strong evidences from a set of cross-sectional studies that the 
development of financial markets lead to better allocation of capital there is hardly any in-
depth country-specific study to substantiate this evidence. Ideally, one could test these 
theories by comparing the model’s predictive power in parallel universes for economies that 
differ only in their degree of financial market development. Although such an approach is 
obviously complex, a feasible alternative would involve testing these conjectures against data 
obtained from a single country over the period of major financial market liberalization. 
Moreover, a successful comparison of this type could have serious policy implications. For 
example, if the model performs better in the liberalized regime, then current practices would 
be vindicated. On the other hand, if no improvement in model performances were to be 
found, such efforts might be misdirected and policy makers might be better advised to take 
necessary steps to correct it. 
 
The Indian experience of the 1990s provides us one such unique opportunity for 
comparing the allocation patterns across two sharply differing degrees of financial market 
development. A hallmark of the new economic policy of India has been the gradual 
liberalization of its financial sector. Until 1992, the Indian corporate sector faced several 
constraints on its choices regarding sources of funds. Access to the equity market was 
regulated by the Controller of Capital Issues (CCI), an agency under the Department of 
Company Affairs, which imposed stringent conditions on firms trying to raise funds through 
the equity route. Long-term borrowing was largely under the purview of the public sector 
Development Financial Institutions (DFIs) which, either through direct lending or through 
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refinancing arrangements, virtually monopolized the supply of debt finance to the corporate 
sector. In May 1992 (two months into the financial year 1992-93), as part of a sweeping set 
of reforms relating to the equity market, the CCI was abolished and access to the equity 
market was made much less restrictive, subject only to meeting certain technical conditions, 
and not to any formal approval process as had been the case earlier. In the secondary market 
several steps were undertaken to improve the informational efficiency and liquidity of the 
Indian stock markets1. 
On the debt front, there were some reforms in the interest rate policy, with the 
institutions increasingly being given freedom to determine their structure of interest rates. 
The capital base of the banks was strengthened by recapitalization and public issues. 
Prudential norms were introduced. Also, identification of non-performing assets, 
classification of assets, provisions for bad debts and recognition of income were tightened 
up. The government reduced pre-empting of bank resources through a gradual reduction in 
reserve requirement ratios. The cash reserve ratio and the statutory liquidity ratio on 
incremental deposits was also reduced significantly over this period. The interest rate 
controls were relaxed as well. Finally, in order to encourage competition, new private sector 
banks were given licenses and branch-licensing restrictions were relaxed. The Government 
reduced its stake in many financial institutions.  
It has been widely discussed and documented that the financial liberalization has 
been successful in helping the Indian managers to access wide range of funds in the post 
reform period. Particularly in the early years of the reform (1992-1995), equity market 
became a major source of funds (Bhaduri, 2000). However, research on the allocation of 
such funds is limited and practically non-existent for India. 
We, therefore, examine the allocation pattern in India during the period 1993-2008 
to assess the impact of ongoing financial liberalization on the allocation of capital. The 
question being addressed is: How the ongoing financial liberalization impacted the capital 
allocation pattern in India during 1993-2008? More specifically, the paper explores questions 
such as: Was the total fund available for investment allocated to the more profitable 
industries and to the better firms within an industry during this sample period (1993-2008)? 
Can we relate the efficiency of firm to firm specific characteristics such as ownership, stock 
                                                 
1 See Gokarn et al (2004) for a description and analysis of equity market reforms. A detailed description of 
specific measure of financial liberalization is available in Sen and Vaidya (1997). 
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market affiliation, the proportion of bank borrowing, size and age of the firm using a large 
sample of Indian firms for the period 1994-2008. 
However it is important to note that our study focuses on the post reform period. 
Since the allocation efficiency was severely distorted through strong Governmental 
interventions and stringent regulations in the pre-reform period we have ignored the pre-
reform trends and focused only on the post reform period when the Indian firms were 
given enough freedom to make rational choices. Finally, it is also important to note that 
there is a similar strand of literature which examines the relationship between investment 
and firm growth using the financial constraints hypothesis (Fazarri, Hubbard, and Petersen 
(1988)). In this literature, whether or not an average firm experiences financial constraint is 
deduced from the sign and significance of the coefficient of the cash flow variable. However 
as some attempts have already been made to examine this hypothesis for India, we have 
pursed the alternative approach for this paper (Bhaduri, 2005). 
 
Apart from its contribution to the sparse literature on whether financial liberalization 
improves the allocation of capital, the paper is also complementary to a growing body of 
literature that studies the relationship between finance and economic growth. At the country 
level, King and Levine (1993), Levine (1998), Levine and Zervos (1998), and Beck, Levine, 
and Loayza (2000) make an empirical case that financial development causes growth. At the 
firm level, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) use a financial planning model to 
estimate sustainable growth rates in the absence of external finance and find that firms in 
financially developed countries are able to grow faster than this benchmark. One of the 
central questions asked by the researchers on this topic is whether better allocation of capital 
is a reason why financial development is associated with the economic growth. Several 
authors have inclined to agree with this line of causality including Goldsmith (1969), 
McKinnon (1973), Shaw (1973), and Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990). Some empirical 
evidences support this suggestion. Bagehot (1873) cites better capital allocation as a primary 
reason for England’s comparatively faster growth in the mid-to-late 19th century. Further, in 
their cross-country study, Beck et al. infer that the link between finance and growth is 
improved allocation efficiency, as suggested by the fact that financial development 
(specifically, the banking sector) is robustly associated not with higher capital accumulation 
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but rather with higher productivity growth, which is how an improvement in capital 
allocation is expressed in their growth accounting framework.  
Therefore, the paper also aims to contribute to this sparsely researched issue from 
the perspective of a developing economy in general and India in particular. The result of this 
paper stands contrary to the general view that financial liberalization leads to higher 
economic growth through better resource allocation. The result indicates that liberalization 
effort in developing countries should be accompanied by concerted effort to strengthen the 
appropriate markets (market for corporate control) and institutions that create necessary 
incentive for the private firms to pursue value-maximizing policies. Failing this, financial 
liberalization can lead to greater misallocation of resources and hence can deter economic 
growth. 
The paper is organized as follows: The next section outlines the empirical framework 
underlying the study. Data and sample are discussed in section 3. We present and interpret 
our results in section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Empirical Framework: 
 
Wurgler (2000) argues that the capital allocation is improved through at least three 
mechanisms. First, countries with stock markets that impound more firm-specific 
information into individual stock prices exhibit a better allocation of capital. This is 
consistent with the suggestion that larger markets have more informative prices which help 
investors and managers distinguish between good and bad investments. Second, capital 
allocation improves as state ownership declines. This is not surprising since, in state-owned 
firms, resource allocation is guided less by value-maximization than by political motives. 
Also, soft budget constraints and poor monitoring give managers in state-owned firms few 
incentives for efficiency. The existing evidence on this supports Shleifer’s (1998, p. 144) view 
that “elimination of politically motivated resource allocation has unquestionably been the 
principal benefit of privatization around the world.” Third, strong minority investor rights, 
as measured by La Porta et al. (1997), are associated with better capital allocation. The 
allocation benefit of investor rights seems to come through limiting over-investment in 
declining firms rather than through improving the supply of finance to growing firms. 
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Despite this growing body of literature, there has been very little empirical evidence on 
whether the financial market development improves the allocation of capital. This paper 
makes an attempt to fill this gap, particularly in the context of a developing economy like 
India and tries to investigate the issue by using the following empirical methodology. 
 
We investigate the impact of financial liberalization on the efficiency of allocation of 
resources using two well known approaches: simple efficiency of allocation index and 
efficiency elasticity.  
 
2.1. Efficiency Index of Allocation: 
 
The paper uses a simple index developed by Galindo, Schiantarelli, Weiss, (2007) to evaluate 
whether liberalization succeeds in directing resources towards the firms with higher marginal 
returns. Typically, in estimating the efficiency of the allocation of investment we first need 
measures of the marginal product of investment. In general, an explicit measure of the 
marginal product of investment cannot be obtained without knowing the parameters of the 
production function. To circumvent the problem it is assumed that the marginal product of 
capital is proportional to particular measures of the average product of capital. The measure 
of the average product of capital that has been used in this paper is the ratio of operating 
profits to capital2. It is also important to note that this measure is valid only under the 
assumption that the production function is homogeneous of degree one. We estimate the 
return to investment for each firm by multiplying investment with the proposed measure of 
the firm’s marginal product of investment. We sum the return to investment for each firm, 
across all firms, in order to arrive at the total return to investment for the economy in a 
particular year. Finally, the total return to investment for the economy in a particular year 
can be obtained by summing up the return across all the firms.  
 
                                                 
2 Notably, Galindo, Schiantarelli, Weiss, (2007) in their study involving cross country comparison, had argued 
for sales based measure over profit based measure to avoid country specific bias due variability in their tax 
regime. However, in our study we have used profit based measure since we are interested in the trends in the 
efficiency over the reform period for India.   
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To obtain a measure of the efficiency of the allocation of investment in a year, this measure 
of the total return on investment is divided by the total return the same measures would 
have yielded if investment funds had been allocated to firms in proportion to their share of 
capital in the economy. In other words, the measure of the efficiency of the allocation of 
investment is the ratio of estimate of the actual total return on investment to estimate the 
total return that would have been achieved if investment funds were allocated according to 
each firm’s share of the capital stock. It is noteworthy that the index is invariant to 
macroeconomic changes that raise the value of the marginal product of capital uniformly for 
all firms. Using operating profits per unit of capital as a measure of the marginal product of 
investment proxy, the following measure of the efficiency of the allocation of investment 
funds is proposed:  
Efficiency Index based on operating profit ( ) 
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Where  operating profits of firm i at t+1 period, is growth in gross block (fixed 
investment) at t time period, and 1capital employed at time period t+1. and 
represent, aggregate investment and aggregate capital at time t, respectively. Note 
that each unit of investment in year t increases the capital stock, and hence generates a 
return, in year t+1.  
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2.2 Elasticity of Efficiency of Allocation: 
 
This approach focuses on the very basic definition of an efficient allocation mechanism, 
which implies higher investment in “growing” firms and lesser investment in the firms that 
are “declining”.  The following simple specification captures the idea:  
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ln(Iit/Iit-1) =   α +β1 ln(GVAit/GVAit-1) +β2Zit+  εit   (1) 
Following Wurgler(2000),the growth in gross value added (GVA) is used as a proxy 
to measure firm growth. Since the sum of value added across all firms in the economy is 
GDP, and economic growth is typically measured as growth in GDP, the use of growth in 
firm value added to capture growth could therefore be justified. The growth in gross fixed 
asset (GFA) is used as a measure of investment. The slope estimate (β1) in the above 
equation is an elasticity and higher its value lesser is the misallocation of capital. Zits are 
the control variables used in the model. The component of Z consists of four explanatory 
variables: Size of the firm captured using the logarithm of total assets, age of the firm 
(log(age)), proportion of bank loans in total borrowing and a binary variable that takes a 
value one if the firm is listed in the stock exchange.  Size and age are often considered as 
significant determinants of growth and some recent studies in India (Shanmugam and 
Bhaduri, 2002) report that smaller and older firms grow faster than their counterparts. 
Similarly, it is often argued that investment by firms with close bank relationships 
appears to be less liquidity constrained than investment by firms without close bank ties 
(Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein1990a,1990b). Finally, we also control for the access to 
the capital market through listing information. Further, it is important to note that listing 
information and proportion of bank loan might also have impact on the quality of 
investment through bank monitoring and market disciplines. The monitoring associated 
with bank finance is often considered to ameliorate a moral hazard problem between the 
entrepreneurs and their lenders Diamond (1991).      
 A few points about the specification (equation 1) warrant discussion. First, the 
specification is developed on the premise that growth in industry value added captures 
investment opportunities for firms. Therefore, it is important to verify that value added 
growth is correlated with more traditional measure of investment opportunity like, Q, the 
price earning ratio, and sales growth etc. Though there is some evidence for the US on this 
issue, it is yet to be verified for emerging economies like India. The other alternative would 
be to use the standard Q model for the analysis. However, in an imperfect capital market, 
like India, the Q model may be a questionable framework for investment analysis. In the 
presence of market imperfection, market expectation might not truly reflect the insiders’ 
valuation of investment opportunities. In such an environment, growth in industry value 
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added would be a better measure of investment opportunities than any measure based on 
stock prices.  
Second, reverse causality might appear to be another concern in the specification as 
investment can cause a contemporaneous change in value added. However, investment can 
influence value added contemporaneously if fixed capital become productive immediately – a 
fact usually refuted by the empirical literature on gestation lags (Mayer, 1960 and Hall, 1977). 
We have also tried various alternative specifications to accommodate the possibility of 
gestation lag by introducing lagged values of independent variables (GVA) into the model. 
Finally, it is important to note that the specification used in this paper is a-theoretic. Ideally, 
a structural investment equation would have been a better choice. However, low quality data 
on capital stock, particularly at the aggregate (industry) level, makes it difficult to precisely 
estimate a structural investment equation based on the production theory. In contrast, 
methodology used in this paper avoids these problems by focusing on the allocation of 
capital from directly observing the investment flows.  
Next, a common empirical approach has been deployed in the literature to estimate a 
constant elasticity model (equation (1)) by using ordinary least square method. One key 
assumption of the constant elasticity specification is the homogeneity of the beta parameters 
across the sample. The OLS regression estimates the mean effect of the efficiency elasticity 
and does not take full account of the heterogeneity in the growth of investment across firms. 
In this study we offer to estimate the efficiency elasticity using quantile regression. The 
quantile regression developed by Koenker and Bassett (1978) makes it possible to estimate 
the elasticity at the different points of the growth of investment distributions. The basic 
quantile regression model specifies the conditional quantile as a linear function of 
explanatory variables and is given as: 
  
10);()|( <<′==
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where Y is the dependent variable, X is the  matrix of exploratory variables,  ε  is the error 
term and  denotes the )|( xXYQ =θ θ th quantile of Y conditional on X=x. The θ th 
regression quantile estimate, (
^β θ ) is obtained by minimizing following equation: 
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For θ =0.5, the procedure leads to minimization of the sum of absolute deviation, known 
as median regression.  Therefore, by choosing θ  continuously from 0 to 1, one can trace 
the distribution of Y, conditional on X, and obtain a much more complete view of the 
effect of the explanatory variable on the dependent variable. This specific feature of 
quantile regression has been exploited in the paper to estimate the elasticity at the different 
points of the growth of investment distributions. It is also important to note that 
segmenting the Y and then running an OLS on the subset is not an appropriate alternative 
to the quantile regression, due to severe sample selection bias (Koenker and Hallock, 
2001).   
Finally it is important to note that we exclude the firm specific effect in the quantile 
regression as the implementation and the interpretation of the firm specific effects are not 
straightforward in the quantile regression framework (Arias et al 2001, Koenker 2004).   
 
Using a large and unbalanced panel of more than forty thousand firm-time observations over 
the period, 1994-2008, we employ the quantile regression to estimate and compare efficiency 
elasticity at different quantiles of the distribution across time. The results show that 
elasticities are significantly different for firms that are at the opposite tails of the distribution.  
3. Sample and Data Description: 
  
The data for this analysis is drawn from the Capita Line database and the sample of the 
study consists of observations from 1994-2008. The Capita Line database reports accounting 
information for a large number of firms operating in the Indian manufacturing sector.  The 
database reports the individual level data for each individual firm during a particular year. 
From this data set we have selected a set of 30 major industries for our analysis and Table 1 
lists number of observations in each year.  
 
The variables used in the dataset are capital employed, gross value added, gross fixed asset, 
operating profit of the firm, total investment, bank loans, ownership group, size and age of 
the firm. As regard to total capital, it has increased drastically over the years while there is 
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slight consistent increase in total investment by the firm. However, as these numbers can be 
influenced by the number of observation in each year we have also looked into the average 
values of investment, value added (VA) and profitability in Figure 1. 
The figure 1 shows on an average there is a consistent relationship between growth in value 
added (Profitability) and investment. However, as one can note from table 2A and 2B that 
the over all trend also hides the fact that a large number of negatively growing value added 
firms in Indian manufacturing industry undertake investment. Further, the trend remains 
invariant even if we consider the lag values of value added growth. In particular, table 2A 
and 2B highlights the fact that a growing percentage of Indian firms continue to invest 
despite having negative value added growth. However, this tale-tell signs of misallocation of 
resources needs to be further explored through our empirical models.  
 
 
Table 1: Distribution of firms in the sample 
Year  Number of firms 
1994  1923 
1995  2297 
1996  2356 
1997  1791 
1998  2499 
1999  2992 
2000  3002 
2001  3149 
2002  3337 
2003  3360 
2004  3324 
2005  3342 
2006  3271 
2007  3232 
2008  3080 
 
Figure 1: Trend in value added, profitability and investment of the Indian 
manufacturing 
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industry.
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Table 2A: Investment decisions of the negative valued added firms (number in the 
parenthesis gives the percentage value). 
year Negative gr. In value 
added 
Negative gr. In 
investment 
positive growth in 
investment 
1994 316  22 (0.07) 294 (0.93) 
1995 332  23 (0.07) 309 (0.93) 
1996 537  34 (0.06) 503 (0.94) 
1997 608  48 (0.08) 560 (0.92) 
1998 910  85 (0.09) 825 (0.91) 
1999 1132  128 (0.11) 1004 (0.89) 
2000 1015  126 (0.12) 889 (0.88) 
2001 1228  170 (0.14) 1058 (0.86) 
2002 1315  158 (0.12) 1157 (0.88) 
2003 1119  175 (0.16) 944 (0.84) 
2004 971  158 (0.16) 813 (0.84) 
2005 896  136 (0.15) 760 (0.85) 
2006 774  111 (0.14) 663 (0.86) 
2007 743  112 (0.15) 631 (0.85) 
2008 758  95 (0.13) 663 (0.87) 
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Table 2B: Investment Decisions of Negative Valued added firms (number in the 
parenthesis gives the percentage value). 
year Positive growth in 
investment 
Negative gr. In value 
added 
Positive gr. In value added 
1994 1844  317 (0.17) 1527 (0.83) 
1995 2216  336 (0.15) 1880 (0.85) 
1996 2270  535 (0.24) 1735 (0.76) 
1997 1682  574 (0.34) 1108 (0.66) 
1998 2292  849 (0.37) 1443 (0.63) 
1999 2701  1046 (0.39) 1655 (0.61) 
2000 2681  915 (0.34) 1766 (0.66) 
2001 2762  1095 (0.4) 1667 (0.6) 
2002 2899  1194 (0.41) 1705 (0.59) 
2003 2921  980 (0.34) 1941 (0.66) 
2004 2868  848 (0.3) 2020 (0.7) 
2005 2887  791 (0.27) 2096 (0.73) 
2006 2884  681 (0.24) 2203 (0.76) 
2007 2885  661 (0.23) 2224 (0.77) 
2008 2758  685 (0.25) 2073 (0.75) 
 
4. Empirical Results:  
 
To facilitate the interpretation and avoid short term fluctuations, we report a three years 
average of simple efficiency index in table 3 and plot the same trend in Figure 2. Though 
there is a significant variance in the numbers reported in table 1, we can see some trends in 
the data: A point-to-point comparison shows a declining trend in efficiency for government 
owned and non listed firms. A similar upward trend is observed for private and listed firms. 
Consistent with our efficiency hypothesis outlined earlier, private and listed firms tend be 
more efficient than their counterparts. Though the trends presented so far provides some 
tell-tale signs of a change in efficiency of the Indian firms after liberalization, we need 
further investigation using the efficiency elasticity for a robust conclusion.      
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Table 3: Trend in simple efficiency index 1994-2008 
 
Year All Govt. Pvt. Listed  Non Listed 
1994-96 0.984826 0.9671 1.016305 1.003599 1.09236255
1997-99 1.051971 1.060236 1.04582 1.061724 1.01057691
2000-02 1.284346 1.066201 1.272182 0.985399 1.13476779
2003-05 1.351665 0.942069 1.012267 1.011282 0.83651842
2006-08 1.001211 0.808049 1.098464 1.012626 1.00795921
% Change 2% -16% 8% 1% -8%
 
 
 
 
 
To facilitate a direct comparison, the model (equation 1) is estimated first by cross 
section OLS regressions for each year. Column 7 in Table 4 presents the elasticity estimates 
from the OLS regressions. The cross-section elasticities clearly show a declining trend over 
the sample period.  Next, we have estimated the model for different values of θ that allows 
an examination of the impact of the explanatory variables at different points of the 
distribution of investment. The quantile estimates for elasticities are reported in Table 4 
(column 1-5). The model is estimated at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th quantiles. We see 
that there are some pronounced differences across different points in the distribution of 
investment growth. First, while the elasticities estimates are all statistically significant for 
OLS regression they are insignificant and small for some of the lower than median quantiles 
indicating that the elasticities are not constant across the various quantiles of investment 
decisions.           
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Figure 1: Trend in Efficiency Index (1994-2008)
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Figure 2 :Trend in Efficiency Elasticity
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Table 4: Trend in efficiency elasticity (β1 of equation 1) over various quntiles.  
year Quantile 
(10%) 
Quantile 
(25%) 
Median Quantile 
(75%) 
Quantile 
 (90%) 
OLS 
1994 0.000 0.012* 0.090* 0.419* 0.432* 0.105* 
1995 0.009* 0.022* 0.100* 0.247* 0.323* 0.103* 
1996 0.009* 0.020* 0.083* 0.171* 0.254* 0.137* 
1997 0.003 0.012* 0.032* 0.088* 0.134* 0.072* 
1998 0.006 0.009 0.022* 0.051* 0.120* 0.116* 
1999 0.004 0.000 0.008* 0.032* 0.080* 0.109* 
2000 0.002 0.000 0.010* 0.028* 0.074* 0.081* 
2001 0.008 0.000 0.006* 0.021* 0.063* 0.083* 
2002 -0.002 0.000 0.003* 0.015* 0.036* 0.046* 
2003 0.005 0.000 0.003* 0.012* 0.034* 0.058* 
2004 0.005 0.000 0.004* 0.022* 0.055* 0.068* 
2005 -0.002 0.000 0.005* 0.025* 0.066* 0.087* 
2006 0.002 0.001 0.007* 0.031* 0.089* 0.061* 
2007 0.006 0.003 0.013* 0.042* 0.083* 0.093* 
2008 -0.001 0.002 0.012* 0.028* 0.058* 0.063* 
Note: The statistical significance (1%) of the coefficient is indicated by *. 
 
Second, the decline in elasticities is more pronounced for higher quantiles than that of 
lower quantiles, indicating a higher level of misallocation of resources with a higher 
investment growth. Third, we see a significant convergence of elasticities across the 
quantiles over the sample period.    
The estimates of control variables also provide certain interesting features of the 
investment behavior of the Indian firms as reported in the appendix of the paper.  The age 
variable (Table A1) enters the regression with a negative sign at the lower end of the 
distribution and gradually becomes more pronounced towards the right end of the 
distribution. Therefore, the impact of age on investment behaviour, particularly the 
magnitude, is not constant and rises with the investment. The next determinant of the 
investment behaviour: the coefficient of size (Table A2) is both significant and positive at 
the higher quantiles. The coefficient on bank proportion (Table A3) is positive and 
significant at the median indicating that firms with bank links tend to have better access 
to fund and can undertake higher investment. However, the coefficients tend to become 
insignificant for the higher quantiles. Finally, Government owned firms (Table A4 and 
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A5) tend to invest less at the median while we do not see any clear trend for the listed 
firms.      
Further, to investigate the decline in elasticities over the sample period we estimate 
the equation 1 separately using observations in which firm value added is growing and 
the observations in which firm value added is declining. Since the fall in elasticity could 
be due to either underinvestment in growing firms or over investment in declining firms 
or both, this segmented analysis using the two sets of observation will shed some light on 
the nature of misallocation. Figure 3 and 4 report the trend in elasticities for firms with 
positive value added growth and negative value added growth respectively. In contrast to 
Figure 2, figure 3 and 4 clearly demonstrate that the observed decline in elasticities can 
be contributed to over investment in declining firms, particularly at the higher quantiles.    
  
Figure 3 :Trend in Efficiency Elasticity (Postive Value Added 
Firms)
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Figure 4: Trend in Efficiency Elasticity (Negative Value Added 
Firms)
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Finally to understand the nature and cause of this misallocation we augment our basic 
equation with three interaction terms: value added interacted with these three variables, 
such as government ownership dummy, listing dummy and bank proportion of loan in 
total borrowings. These three additional variables will be able to shed some light on the 
sources of misallocation across various types of firms. In the spirit of Fama and MacBeth 
(1973) we use averages of the annual slopes from the augmented equation and time series 
standard errors of the average to draw inferences. The advantage of this approach is that 
the year-by-year variation in the slopes, which determines the standard errors of the 
average slopes, includes estimation error due to the correlation of the residuals across 
firms. The standard errors are also robust with respect to heteroscedasticity, since there is 
no heteroscedasticity correction for a sample mean.  
 
Table 5 reports the average estimates for the model augmented with interaction 
variables. In consistence with these theories, our results show that firms which are 
subjected to the capital market disciplines are more efficient than their counterparts. 
Similarly the government owned firms are less efficient than the private counterparts 
indicating that the government owned firms often have political considerations, and not 
efficiency as the primary determinant of allocation policy.  Therefore, even after 
liberalization these two factors tend to contribute to the misallocation of capital in a 
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significant way. However, it is important to note that the decline in efficiency, in the post 
liberalized period, can not only be attributed to these two groups as misallocation is 
evenly spread across all segments of firms. The one plausible reason for such 
misallocation in the post liberalized regime could be due to excessive capacity creation in 
certain industries, financed by cheap external sources of finance, without any 
consideration of return or demand conditions (Bhaduri 2000).  Finally, though not 
statistically significant for the interaction term, a negative coefficient on the proportion of 
bank borrowing indicates a disturbing trend of a higher level of misallocation of resource 
for firms with bank relation.  It is often argued that the monitoring associated with bank 
finance would tend to ameliorate a moral hazard problem between the entrepreneurs and 
their lenders. Therefore a failure in the effective monitoring of allocation of fund by 
banks can have a severe adverse consequence for a predominantly bank based economy 
such as India.      
 
 
 
Table 5:  Parameter estimates of the augmented model capturing the interaction 
effects.   
 OLS  SE  t 
Growth in value added  0.122 0.023 5.295*
log(age)  -0.109 0.025 -4.385*
log(total Assets)  0.037 0.003 11.541*
Bank loan proportion  0.034 0.003 10.967*
Government firm (Dummy takes  1 for Govt. Firms)  -0.020 0.007 -2.745*
NSE listed firm (Dummy takes 1 for NSE  listed firms)  -0.022 0.006 -3.603*
Interaction (growth in value added & NSE)  0.152 0.044 3.470*
Interaction (growth in value added & Bank loan)  -0.044 0.034 -1.271
Interaction (growth in value added & Gov)  -0.077 0.027 -2.888*
Note: The statistical significance (1%) of the coefficient is indicated by *. The table shows means (across years) of the 
regression intercepts (Int) and slopes, and t-statistics for the means, t(Mn), defined as the mean divided by its standard 
error [the times-series standard deviation of the regression coefficient divided by (15)1/2] 
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5. Conclusion: 
 
The paper explores the impact of financial liberalization on the allocation of capital in the 
context of a developing economy, India. Based on these results, one can infer that in the 
post liberalization period, there was a strong and harmful tendency in the Indian 
corporate sector towards misallocation of resources. This stands contrary to the 
conventional wisdom that financial liberalization leads to better allocation of capital.  Our 
within-year estimates show a decline in the elasticity during the initial phase of reform 
while some signs of improvement in allocation elasticity are observed during the later 
phase of reform. The study also highlights the disturbing trend of convergence of 
efficiencies across various strata of firms towards a lower level during the post 
liberalization period. 
Undoubtedly, the surge in the availability of funds in the stock market, particularly 
during the early years of liberalization, has encouraged many corporate to adjust their 
financial structure. Nevertheless, the same factor has also generated a negative aspect due 
to excessive capacity creation in certain industries, financed by cheap external sources of 
finance, without any consideration of return or demand conditions (Bhaduri 2000). The 
phenomenon is a serious detraction from one of the major expected benefits of the 
removal of financial repression in a developing country and calls for a serious rethinking 
in the corporate governance policy. Notwithstanding the limitations of generalizing from 
a restricted context, our findings suggest that a move towards liberalized access to 
external finance, particularly equity sources of finance, in developing countries, should 
be accompanied by concerted effort to strengthen the appropriate markets (market for 
corporate control) and institutions that create necessary incentive for the private firms to 
pursue value maximizing projects.   
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Appendix: 
A1: Estimates of Log (Age) to explain the investment behaviour (Equation 1). 
year Percentile 
(10%) 
Median Percentile 
(75%) 
Percentile 
(90%) 
OLS 
1994 0.000  ‐0.094*  ‐0.258*  ‐0.560*  ‐0.319* 
1995 ‐0.005*  ‐0.098*  ‐0.266*  ‐0.614*  ‐0.309* 
1996 ‐0.006*  ‐0.068*  ‐0.205*  ‐0.414*  ‐0.235* 
1997 ‐0.002*  ‐0.012*  ‐0.064*  ‐0.171*  ‐0.080* 
1998 ‐0.001*  ‐0.011*  ‐0.063*  ‐0.189*  ‐0.103* 
1999 ‐0.006*  ‐0.001*  ‐0.014*  ‐0.058*  ‐0.033* 
2000 ‐0.008*  0.000*  ‐0.011*  ‐0.042*  ‐0.041* 
2001 ‐0.013*  ‐0.004*  ‐0.020*  ‐0.099*  ‐0.063* 
2002 ‐0.019*  ‐0.003*  ‐0.018*  ‐0.065*  ‐0.056* 
2003 ‐0.010*  ‐0.004*  ‐0.024*  ‐0.068*  ‐0.042* 
2004 ‐0.009*  ‐0.005*  ‐0.030*  ‐0.088*  ‐0.084* 
2005 ‐0.027*  ‐0.009*  ‐0.035*  ‐0.101*  ‐0.105* 
2006 ‐0.019*  ‐0.011*  ‐0.052*  ‐0.125*  ‐0.097* 
2007 ‐0.008*  ‐0.012*  ‐0.049*  ‐0.113*  ‐0.075* 
2008 ‐0.007*  ‐0.011*  ‐0.046*  ‐0.093*  ‐0.028* 
 
A2: Estimates of Log (Total Assets) to explain the investment behaviour 
(Equation 1). 
year Percentile 
(10%) 
Median Percentile 
(75%) 
Percentile 
(90%) 
OLS 
1994 0.000  0.017*  0.028*  0.036*  0.051* 
1995 0.005*  0.024*  0.028*  ‐0.002  0.039* 
1996 0.006*  0.022*  0.018*  ‐0.009  0.020* 
1997 0.003*  0.016*  0.024*  0.027*  0.025* 
1998 0.006*  0.014*  0.027*  0.041*  0.034* 
1999 0.007*  0.010*  0.022*  0.042*  0.045* 
2000 0.005*  0.008*  0.016*  0.027*  0.024* 
2001 0.007*  0.005*  0.014*  0.023*  0.030* 
2002 0.010*  0.006*  0.016*  0.030*  0.038* 
2003 0.008*  0.005*  0.011*  0.012*  0.017* 
2004 0.009*  0.005*  0.014*  0.019*  0.030* 
2005 0.021*  0.009*  0.022*  0.033*  0.042* 
2006 0.012*  0.015*  0.030*  0.038*  0.042* 
2007 0.013*  0.018*  0.035*  0.049*  0.058* 
2008 0.011*  0.019*  0.042*  0.069*  0.057* 
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A3: Estimates of bank loan proportion in total borrowings to explain the 
investment behaviour (Equation 1). 
year Percentile 
(10%) 
Median Percentile 
(75%) 
Percentile 
(90%) 
OLS 
1994 0.000  ‐0.017  ‐0.056  ‐0.047  ‐0.019 
1995 0.002  ‐0.013  ‐0.022  0.098  0.024 
1996 0.001  0.006  ‐0.015  ‐0.043  0.006 
1997 0.010*  0.011  0.005  ‐0.016  0.033* 
1998 0.026*  0.002  0.004  ‐0.047  0.036* 
1999 0.035*  0.002  0.006  0.023  0.028* 
2000 0.034*  0.002  0.006  ‐0.020  0.024* 
2001 0.037*  0.003*  0.000  ‐0.005  0.051* 
2002 0.032*  0.001*  0.000  ‐0.002  0.023* 
2003 0.041*  0.003*  0.009*  0.011  0.045* 
2004 0.051*  0.005*  0.012*  0.017  0.042* 
2005 0.047*  0.005*  0.015*  0.030*  0.045* 
2006 0.025*  0.006*  0.024*  0.028  0.039* 
2007 0.037*  0.012*  0.020*  0.022  0.035* 
2008 0.021*  0.008*  0.010*  0.009  0.027* 
 
A5: Estimates of Government ownership dummy to explain the investment 
behaviour (Equation 1). 
year Percentile 
(10%) 
Median Percentile 
(75%) 
Percentile 
(90%) 
OLS 
1994 0.000  ‐0.030  ‐0.064*  ‐0.139  ‐0.106* 
1995 ‐0.007  ‐0.056*  ‐0.076*  ‐0.010  ‐0.038 
1996 ‐0.011*  ‐0.052*  ‐0.045*  ‐0.021  ‐0.018 
1997 ‐0.002  ‐0.030*  ‐0.047*  ‐0.092  ‐0.021 
1998 0.002  ‐0.023*  ‐0.050*  ‐0.066  ‐0.026 
1999 0.004  ‐0.014*  ‐0.026  ‐0.007  0.009 
2000 0.002  ‐0.009*  ‐0.017  ‐0.047  ‐0.002 
2001 0.001  ‐0.002*  ‐0.010  ‐0.001  ‐0.005 
2002 0.002  ‐0.005*  ‐0.017*  ‐0.010  ‐0.004 
2003 0.002  ‐0.008*  ‐0.025*  ‐0.038  ‐0.014 
2004 ‐0.004  ‐0.006*  ‐0.018*  ‐0.002  ‐0.019 
2005 ‐0.009  ‐0.019*  ‐0.024*  0.012  0.008 
2006 ‐0.001  ‐0.029*  ‐0.040*  ‐0.052  ‐0.042 
2007 ‐0.003  ‐0.029*  ‐0.054*  ‐0.061  ‐0.048 
2008 ‐0.004  ‐0.024*  ‐0.042*  ‐0.062  ‐0.041 
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A6: Estimates of stock exchange listing dummy to explain the investment 
behaviour (Equation 1). 
year Percentile 
(10%) 
Median Percentile 
(75%) 
Percentile 
(90%) 
OLS 
1994 0.010  0.007  ‐0.029  ‐0.057  ‐0.037 
1995 0.007*  0.002  ‐0.028  ‐0.047  ‐0.033 
1996 0.013*  0.023*  0.003  ‐0.014  0.018 
1997 0.007*  0.015*  0.002  ‐0.034  ‐0.015 
1998 0.012*  0.014*  0.004*  ‐0.036  ‐0.001 
1999 0.004  0.018*  0.017*  0.006  ‐0.030* 
2000 0.006  0.015*  0.024*  0.017  0.024 
2001 0.004  0.020*  0.027*  0.038  0.018 
2002 0.000  0.015*  0.022*  0.076*  0.004 
2003 0.000  0.011*  0.031*  0.051*  0.020 
2004 ‐0.002  0.016*  0.032*  0.044*  ‐0.010 
2005 ‐0.001  0.022*  0.020*  ‐0.002  0.002 
2006 ‐0.006  0.020*  0.020*  0.007  ‐0.004 
2007 0.007  0.005  ‐0.002  0.003  ‐0.028 
2008 0.004  0.004  ‐0.035*  ‐0.091*  ‐0.052* 
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